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DOES LAND ABUNDANCE EXPLAIN AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS?
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. I show that abundant land and scarce labor shaped African institutions before
colonial rule. I test a model in which exogenous land quality and endogenously evolving
population determine the existence of land rights and slavery. I use cross-sectional data
on a global sample of societies to demonstrate that, as in the model, land rights occurred
where land quality was high and where population density was greatest. Slavery existed
where land was good and population density was intermediate. The model predicts insti-
tutional differences across regions, but not within regions. I present suggestive evidence
that this is due to institutional spillovers.
1. INTRODUCTION
The “land abundance” view of African history is an influential explanation of the eco-
nomic institutions that existed on the continent before colonial rule (Austin, 2008a;
Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe, 1995). This theory holds that, since uncleared land was freely avail-
able, land had no price, and rights to land were ill-defined. Because cultivators would
not become free workers, coerced and household labor substituted for wage employ-
ment. Lagerlo¨f’s (2010) model of “slavery and other property rights” mirrors these argu-
ments in a formal model. In this paper, I use cross-sectional data on a sample of global
societies to test this view. I show that land rights and slavery existed in those regions pre-
dicted by the model, but that institutional spillovers prevent the model from predicting
differences within broad geographic regions.1
The pre-colonial institutions explained by the “land abundance” view constrained the
actions of colonial powers (e.g. Austin (2008b)). As a result, pre-colonial institutions
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and the forces that shaped them affect current performance in Africa (e.g. Gennaioli
and Rainer (2007) or Tertilt (2005)). It is well established in economics that institutions
matter (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dell, nd). Land rights and slavery, in particular, continue
to affect outcomes in Africa and in the rest of the world. Land tenure shapes investment
incentives (Goldstein and Udry, 2008), labor-supply (Field, 2007), and violence (Andre
and Platteau, 1998). Nunn (2008) shows that those African countries that exported the
most slaves are comparatively poor today. The pre-colonial prevalence of indigenous
slavery is negatively correlated with current income within Africa (Bezemer et al., 2009).
Within the Americas, legacies of slavery explain differences in income across countries
and U.S. counties (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn, 2007), as well as long term racial
gaps in education and other measures (Miller, 2008; Sacerdote, 2005). Explaining pre-
colonial land tenure and slavery is, then, important in understanding African poverty.
The “land abundance” view of African history argues that the continent’s geography
has given it an abundance of land relative to labor, which explains the general features
of its development. In other contexts, geographic features, such as continental orien-
tation, ruggedness, settler mortality, suitability for specific crops, and other biogeo-
graphic endowments predict contemporary institutional differences across countries
(Bubb, 2009; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn and Puga,
2007). The model I test, from Lagerlo¨f (2010), similarly allows geography to shape in-
stitutions. There are two important variables determining land rights and slavery. The
first is exogenous land quality. This increases the returns to landownership, compen-
sates for the inefficiencies of slavery, and sustains greater populations in the Malthusian
steady state. The second is population, which responds to both the geographic and in-
stitutional environments. It shapes the relative values of land and labor and the relative
costs of free and forced workers.
I test this thesis. I use data on a cross-section of global societies from Murdock’s (1967)
Ethnographic Atlas to support a model of land rights and slavery in which the land-
labor ratio determines the institutions that exist. I find that the model correctly predicts
that land rights and slavery were found in those societies that occupied the best land,
and that greater population densities were correlated with rights over land. Slavery was
present when population densities were intermediate, as in the model. While the model
predicts differences across regions, there are forms of slavery that it cannot predict, and
it is not capable of predicting differences within regions.
In Section 2, I outline the literature in African history on how land abundance has
shaped economic institutions. Here, I present the basic features of the model and its
testable implications. In Section 3, I describe the data used and lay out the econometric
specifications. In Section 4, I report the results of these tests. In Section 5, I show that
these results are robust to different measures of the institutional outcomes, alternative
proxies for land quality and historical population density, and the possible endogeneity
of land quality. I also argue that the present theory of slavery better explains the data
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than some prominent alternatives. While the model is generally robust to removing in-
fluential observations, some exceptions suggest the mechanisms by which institutional
transitions occur. In Section 6, I demonstrate that the model is unable to predict dif-
ferences within regions, and that there is substantial spatial correlation in institutional
outcomes. This is consistent with what anthropologists call “Galton’s problem” – the
lack of independence in cultural observations. In Section 7 I conclude. In the appendix,
I provide further evidence in favor of the “land abundance” view by using it to explain
institutions and institutional in one Nigerian society, summarizing an argument I have
made elsewhere.2
2. THE LAND ABUNDANCE VIEW OF AFRICAN HISTORY
2.1. The literature. A first-order task in African history is explaining the continent’s
long-run differences in economic organization from the rest of the world. The start-
ing point of the land abundance view is the difference in settlement patterns between
Africa and the rest of the world on the eve of colonial rule. Herbst (2000, p. 16) es-
timates the population density of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1900 at 4.4 persons per Sq.
Km, contrasted with 38.2 for South Asia, 45.6 for China, and 62.9 for Europe.3 Expla-
nations of low African population densities stress geographic factors, the disease en-
vironment, and historical factors such as the slave trades (Mahadi and Inikori, 1987,
p. 63-64). This sparse settlement, Hopkins (1973, p. 23-27) argues, shaped institutions,
because Africans “measured wealth and power in men rather than in acres.”4 Here, I
focus on the implications for land rights and slavery.
Before the Atlantic slave trade, Africa was characterized by settled clearings surrounded
by vast wastelands in the Equatorial region, circles of increasingly wild vegetation in the
West African forest, and clusters with oscillating frontiers in the West African Savanna
(Iliffe, 1995, p. 36,64-67). Austin (2009, p. 33) argues that, as a consequence, land was
“easily and cheaply accessible in institutional terms”; pre-colonial authorities were ea-
ger to attract “more people with whom to subdue nature and, if necessary, their neigh-
bors,” so that strangers could generally acquire land indefinitely for token payments.
These payments were made solely to acknowledge the sovereignty of the local authori-
ties. Citizens were given land virtually freely. Austin (2008a, p. 591-594) notes that ‘is-
lands’ of intensive agriculture have existed where insecurity has created artificial land
scarcity and in specific locations of exceptional value. These had minerals, trees, market
access, or suitability for particular crops.
2“Land abundance and economic institutions: Egba land and slavery, 1830-1914”, forthcoming, Economic
History Review.
3His estimate for North Africa is 9.4 persons per Sq. Km.
4Austin (2008a, p. 589) argues that Hopkins was the first to make this analysis systematic; earlier writers
on Africa did account for the existence of slavery, for example, by noting Africa’s land abundance – see
Dowd (1917).
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Against these views, Spear (1997, p. 154-157) argues that population density cannot
explain individual cases. While on Mount Meru both the Arusha and the Meru inten-
sified their agriculture as population rose, the less densely settled Meru did so more
readily. Berry (1988), similarly, has noted that inheritance rules, tenancy contracts, and
labor arrangements often prevent tree crops from leading to individualized land tenure
in West Africa. Thornton (1992, p. 75-76) suggests that ownership of land results from
legal claims, not population pressure. In Section 4, I show that the institutional effects
of population and agricultural productivity are systematic, even if they are not deter-
ministic.
For Austin (2008a, p. 606-610), scarcity of labor explains African use of extensive agri-
culture, dry season crafts and industries, and forced labor. With some notable excep-
tions (Rodney, 1966), slavery was prevalent in much of Africa even prior to the Atlantic
slave trade (Fage, 1969). Watson (1980, p. 10) suggests that the ability of slaves and their
descendants to assimilate into their owners’ lineages was a “logical extension of the in-
stitutionalized need for more people.” Land abundance has been used to explain differ-
ences across societies. Northrup (1979) contrasts the densely-settled Igbo of the palm
belt with the relatively sparsely populated northeastern Igbo during the palm oil trade.
Slavery did not expand in the palm belt, while the northeastern Igbo used slaves to col-
onize new land.
The use of underpopulation to explain African slavery is controversial. Writers such
as Kopytoff and Miers (1977, p. 68-69), Lovejoy (1978, p. 349), or Miers and Klein (1998,
p. 4-5) have stressed that they were employed in non-economic uses, distributed by
non-market means, and that colonial rulers turned a blind eye to slavery for political
reasons. I show that the presence of slavery is systematically related to the economic
value of slaves and to population. Kopytoff (1987, p. 46) and Goody (1980, p. 26-31)
suggest that dependents must be “seduced” rather than coerced, so slavery can only
exist in complex societies and states with “well-developed systems of compulsion.” The
model I test demonstrates that high opportunity costs of coercion at low population
densities can be incorporated into a model in which slavery is explained by the high
cost of free labor.
2.2. Model. In this paper, I test the model of “slavery and other property rights” from
Lagerlo¨f (2009). This is for two reasons. First, his model echoes the arguments made
by historians of Africa, making explicit the testable implications of their views. Greater
population lowers average product, which is shared equally in an egalitarian regime.
This creates incentives to create rights over land. Similarly, the relative costs of land
rights and slavery are determined by the competitive wage, which is itself a function of
population size. If population pressure increases labor supply and depresses the wage,
free labor becomes profitable relative to keeping slaves.
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Second, his model extends the “land abundance” literature. If population is suffi-
ciently low, slavery will not exist, since population pressure has not adequately de-
pressed the returns to an egalitarian sharing of output while the opportunity costs of
wasting labor on coercion remain high. This reconciles the land abundance view with
the critiques of Kopytoff and Goody. In addition, the quality of land determines both
the relative profitability of institutional regimes for a given population and the level of
population that can be supported. This variable has been generally neglected by the
Africanist literature. Here, I briefly sketch the basic elements of the model and state its
testable implications.
The model takes a society in period t with a population Pt of non-elite agents and a
comparatively small elite that does not work. The elite chooses institutions. Output Yt
depends on land M , land-augmenting productivity A˜t, and the labor used Lt:
Yt = (MA˜t)
αL1−αt ≡ Aαt L1−αt .(1)
At the beginning of each period, the elite chooses between three regimes based on
which one yields them the greatest profits piit, where i denotes one of three institutional
regimes. The first is egalitarianism. Under this arrangement, there are no land rights or
slavery. The elite and the non-elite each receive average product, and so:
piEt =
(At
Pt
)α
.(2)
The second possible outcome is slavery. Here, the elite enclose the entire land, creat-
ing rights over it. They enslave St slaves from the population, paying them only subsis-
tence income c¯. Each slave requires γ guards, who are also paid c¯, and so the elite payoff
is:
piSt = max
St≤Pt/(1+γ)
{Aαt S1−αt − (1 + γ)c¯St}.(3)
The third possible outcome is free labor. Again, the elite enclose the entire land. Now,
however, they hire members of the population at a competitive wage wt. The elite’s pay-
off is:
piFt = max
Lt≥0
{Aαt L1−αt − wtLt}.(4)
Lagerlo¨f (2009) shows that the state space in At and Pt can be divided into three sets:
SE, in which the elite prefer egalitarianism; SS, in which they prefer slavery, and; SS,
in which they prefer free labor. The boundaries of these regions are defined by three
functions of Pt: Ψ(Pt), Ω(Pt), and Φ(Pt). These are depicted in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1. Institutional regions and dynamics
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The slavery region, SS, is where At ≥ max{Ψ(Pt),Ω(Pt)}, and Pt > (1 + γ)1−α. At ≥
Ψ(Pt) implies that population givenAt is still sufficiently low thatwt is high relative to the
cost of keeping slaves. At ≥ Ω(Pt) implies that population is sufficiently dense that the
average product under egalitarianism has fallen, while high productivity also ensures
the elite is willing to waste some labor on guarding slaves in order to take a greater share
of output for themselves. The opportunity cost of these guards is particularly high when
population is very low, which explains both the slope of Ω(Pt) and the condition that
Pt > (1 + γ)
1−α.
SF is the free labor region, in which Φ(Pt) ≤ At ≤ Ψ(Pt) and Pt > 1/α. Pt > 1/α
ensures that population is great enough that the average product has fallen, making
enclosure worthwhile. At ≤ Ψ(Pt) occurs when population growth pushes down wages
sufficiently relative to the costs of keeping slaves. The condition that Φ(Pt) ≤ At is of
less interest, driven by an assumption that the wage is bounded below by c¯. SE occurs
in the remainder of the state space, where average product and the counterfactual wage
are both relatively high.
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The dynamics of the model are Malthusian and Boserupian. They are Malthusian
in that fertility is increasing in income. Two upward-sloping zero population growth
lines exist – one under slavery and one under egalitarianism and free labor. To the left
of these, income is high and population is growing. To the right, income is low and
population is falling. These are shown in Figure 1 as LE/F (Pt) and LS(Pt).
The dynamics are Boserupian in that agricultural technology in period t + 1 has an
intercept of A¯ and depends positively on both At and Pt. Lagerlo¨f (2009) takes A¯ as
the “minimum level of agricultural technology,” and I interpret it as exogenous land
quality. The result is an upward-sloping zero-technological-growth line LA(Pt). Above
this, productivity degrades, while below this it improves. This is also shown in Figure 1.
A steady state exists where either LE/F (Pt) or LS(Pt) intersects LA(Pt). Figure 1 depicts
a steady state in the free labor region.
What are the testable implications of this model and, by extension, the land abun-
dance view? First, land quality A¯ should positively predict the existence of land rights
and slavery. Land rights do not exist under egalitarianism, and if A¯ is too low, it is impos-
sible to support a steady state under either regime. Similarly, A¯ must be high in order
for a steady state to exist with slavery. However, since larger values of A¯ can support
steady states in both the slavery and free labor regions, the relationship between A¯ and
slavery is expected to be weaker than for land rights. Second, population density, which
I take as corresponding to Pt in the model, will predict land rights and slavery. While
this is an endogenous variable, this is still a correlation implied by the model. For land
rights to exist, Pt must be greater than the cutoffs implied by Ω(Pt), 1/α, and Φ(Pt). For
slavery to exist, Pt must be great enough that enclosure of land is worthwhile and the
opportunity costs of coercion are not too high, but also sparse enough that wages are
not too low. It must, then, be between the cutoffs implied by Ω(Pt) and Ψ(Pt). It is the
implied relationships between land quality, population density, land rights, and slavery
that I test in assessing the ability of the “land abundance view” to explain pre-colonial
institutions in Africa.
3. DATA AND SPECIFICATIONS
In this section, I outline how I test the two predictions of the model described above.
I use a cross section of data on 1,206 societies. In Section 3.1 I detail the specific econo-
metric specifications that I use. In Section 3.2, I describe the sources of data on insti-
tutions, the proxies for the variables A¯ and Pt in the model, and the additional controls
that I include.
3.1. Specifications. The first prediction of the model is that raising A¯ will make it pos-
sible for steady states to exist with land rights or slavery. I test this by estimating:
yi = α + βAAi +X
′
iγ + i,(5)
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics
[Table 1 here]
where yi is an outcome of interest for soceity i,Ai is a proxy for land quality (analogous
to A¯ in the model), Xi is a matrix of geographical controls, and i is random error. (5)
is estimated as a probit with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. I expect that
βA > 0 when yi is an indicator for land rights or slavery.
The second implication of the model is that land rights exist at higher levels of Pt,
while slavery exists at intermediate levels of Pt. I test these by estimating:
yi = α + βp ln(1 + pi) +X
′
iγ + i,(6)
and
yi = α + βp1 ln(1 + pi) + βp2(ln(1 + pi))
2 +X ′iγ + i,(7)
where (abusing notation) yi, Xi, and i are defined as in (5). pi is population density,
the proxy used for Pt. The unusual functional form comes from a visual inspection of
the data – slavery peaks towards the left hand side of the distribution, while a strict
logarithmic specification gives undue influence to very sparsely settled societies. These
are also estimated as probit models. I expect that βp > 0, βp1 > 0, and βp2 < 0.
3.2. Data. I use two types of data to test the ability of the model to explain institutional
differences across societies. The first covers institutions, and is taken from Murdock’s
(1967) Ethnographic Atlas. Published in 29 installments of the journal Ethnology be-
tween 1962 and 1980, the Atlas is a database of 1267 societies from around the world.5
It contains categorical variables describing several institutional and cultural features of
these societies, often at the time of first contact with Europeans. From this sample, I re-
move 2 duplicate observations (the Chilcotin and Tokelau), 8 societies from before 1500
(Anc Egypt, Aryans, Babylonia, Romans, Icelander, Uzbeg, Khmer, Hebrews), and 51 for
which land quality information is missing (mostly small Pacific islands). This leaves a
base sample of 1206 societies. 801 of these have data on land rights, 1041 on slavery.
Two variables from the Ethnographic Atlas are used to construct binary dependent
variables, and summary statistics for these are given in Table 1.6 Indicators are used for
whether individual land rights or slavery exist. I map these variables by the latitude and
longitude coordinates of each society in Figure 2.
5A revised version of the Atlas has been made available for download in SPSS format by J. Patrick Gray at
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/˜drwhite/worldcul/EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav. This is
the version used for the present study.
6These are: V74: Inheritance Rule for Real Property (Land) and V70: Type of Slavery. The definitions of
the binary variables are: 1) Land rights exist if V746=1, 2) slavery exists if V70 > 1.
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FIGURE 2. Land rights and slavery
Land rights are on top, slavery on bottom. Black circles indicate presence, grey circles absence.
Why use this data? The principal justification is availability. This is the only source
of cross-cultural information on land rights and slavery of which I am aware that has
global scope. The only other alternative, the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS)
of Murdock and White (1969), is a derivative of the Ethnographic Atlas. It contains a
smaller sample of societies and a greater number of ethnographic variables. Through-
out the analysis, I validate the measures I use by showing that they are correlated with
alternatives from the SCCS. In addition, the measures in the Ethnographic Atlas are in-
ternally consistent, having been compiled by the same author.
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The greatest concern with these data are that they may be anachronistic. They are
intended to cover societies at an idealized, timeless and synchronic moment of first
European description. In practice, however, many of the observations are constructed
from the works of colonial anthropologists. It is clear from Figure 2, however, that most
of the observations are intended to be uncontaminated by colonial rule. While colonial
governments generally abolished slavery sooner or later, what is coded in the data is
what anthropologists recorded as a society’s “historical” institutions; there is still much
of slavery in Africa according to the Atlas. In so far as the date at which a society is
observed is a proxy for colonial effects and the severity of measurement error, I control
for it in the econometric analysis.
The second type of data used includes features of the natural environment. These
are joined to the data from the Ethnographic Atlas using one of five map sources. First,
African societies were joined to one or more ethnic groups mapped by Murdock (1959)
in his “Tribal Map of Africa.” Second, First Nations groups in the United States and
Canada were joined to the maps that begin the volumes the Handbook of North Ameri-
can Indians (Heizer et al., 1978), digitized for the United States by Dippel (2010) and for
Canada by myself. Third, ethnic groups from the rest of the world were joined to Global
Mapping International’s (GMI) detailed World Language Mapping System. Fourth, if
no match could be found in the GMI map, the less detailed Geo-Referencing Ethnic
Groups (GREG) map created by Weidmann et al. (2010) was used. Finally, if no suitable
match could be found in any of these, groups were matched with modern administrative
boundaries manually. For example, the Dieri are matched with Australia’s “Unincorpo-
rated Far North,” while the Nunivak are matched to Nunivak Island. Not all societies
could be matched exactly. Of 1,267, 100 were matched to a different group indicated in
the same location (such as the Wiyambitu matched to the Shoshone Panamint) while
76 were matched to a larger group of which they form a smaller part (such as the Efik to
the Ibibio). A full table of matches are given in the web appendix.
Once these matches are formed, geographic raster data is joined to them by taking
the average of the points within an ethnic group’s territory. Summary statistics for these
variables are presented in Table 1. Two of these controls are of particular importance –
land quality and population density.
3.2.1. Land quality. The variable used to capture land quality is based on Fischer et al.’s
(2002) measure of combined climate, soil and terrain slope constrains. This is re-scaled
as a standard normal variable between 0 and 1, with larger values indicating an absence
of environmental constrains on rainfed agriculture. This is treated as a proxy for the
variable A¯ in the model.
The constraints measure was constructed as part of the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (FAO-GAEZ) methodology.7 This methodology
7See http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm
LAND ABUNDANCE 11
combines multiple sources of data on climate, soils, and landform to quantify the ex-
pected productivity of all feasible land use and management options on a global scale.
The constraints measure is not particular to any particular crop or technology, and is a
non-additive combination of three components:
(1) Climate constraints: The coldness constraint is “moderate” if there are fewer than
180 days with an average temperature below 5◦C, and “severe” if there are fewer
than 120. Aridity constraints are moderate if there are less than 120 days with an
average temperature below 5◦C during which moisture conditions are adequate
to permit crop growth and severe if there are less than 60.
(2) Soil constraints: Five characteristics of soils are considered – depth, fertility, drainage,
texture and chemical constraints. “Medium” and “shallow” depth are moder-
ate and severe constraints, respectively. “Medium” and “low” fertility are treated
similarly as moderate and severe constraints. “Poor” drainage is a severe con-
straint. Sandy and stony soils are severe constraints, and cracking clay is a mod-
erate constraint. Salinity, sodicity, and gypsum are severe chemical constraints.
(3) Terrain slope constraints: Terrain slopes greater than 8% are “moderate” con-
straints, and slopes greater than 30% are “severe.”
Climate constraints and soil texture are clearly exogenous. Given the manner in which
they are measured, it is unlikely that terrain slope, drainage, and chemical constraints
are consequences of institutions. It is possible, however, that societies that developed
slavery or rights over land were able to avoid degrading the soil depth and fertility. Since
these are only two components of a larger measure, the bias should be small. In addi-
tion, the direct measures of soil depth and fertility constraints can be added as addi-
tional controls. All results for land quality are robust to the inclusion of soil depth and
fertility as separate control variables.
3.2.2. Population density. Constructing historical estimates of population density is guess-
work. One book on estimates for pre-Columbian America is entitled “Numbers from
Nowhere” (Henige, 1998). For Africa, Manning (1990) has made explicit the assump-
tions needed to reconstruct African populations on the eve of colonial rule and earlier.
My approach is to find a simple method to estimate historic population density that can
be applied uniformly over the whole world. In particular, I take raster data on popula-
tion density in 1995 for each of my ethnic groups and combine it with other estimates
of historical population densities for the broader regions within which these groups are
located. Specifically, my estimate of historical population density is:
Historical population density =Population density in 1995×(8)
Regional density at the date of observation
Regional density in 1995
.
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Critically, this assumes that the relative distribution of population has not changed
within regions over time. If the Tamil were 1.37 times as dense as the entirety of the
broad region “India” in 1995, this ratio is pushed back to 1880, the date at which they
are observed. While reasonable as a first order approximation for much of the world,
this will clearly overestimate the densities of some groups (e.g. the Wu Chinese near
modern Shanghai, or Yana of Long Island), while underestimating others. As a result, I
show that the general results survive the use of several different estimators of historic
population density. I use the 1995 densities directly, the historical regional densities
directly, and for roughly 175 societies I have access to independent estimates of their
population densities from the SCCS.
While GIS data on population in 1995 is readily available from the FAO-GAEZ, his-
torical regional estimates are harder to come by. The most commonly used source for
economists is McEvedy et al. (1978), who create estimates at regular intervals for 163
regions of the world. There are, however, well-known problems with these data (Austin,
2008b; Hopkins, 2009). I choose instead to use the ARVE Group’s estimates, constructed
by Krumhardt (2010).8 She incorporates additional estimates and corrections from Du-
rand (1977), Clark (1967), Biraben (1979), Dobyns (1966), and Nevle and Bird (2008),
among others. She divides the world into 209 regions, and gives population estimates
for hundred year periods between 6050 BC and 1850 AD. I impute values between these
years, and between these years and 1995 using exponential trends.9 I use McEvedy et al.
(1978) data as a robustness check and impute values for intermediate years by the same
method. Where McEvedy et al. (1978) report country-level estimates in recent years and
broad regions (e.g. “The Sahel States”) in earlier years, I divide the population among
countries according to their ratio in the earliest year that they are separately reported.
My key estimates of land quality and population density are plotted together in Figure
3.
3.2.3. Other controls. In addition, I control for several other factors that may determine
the existence of land rights and slavery. To make the econometric results easier to inter-
pret, these are re-scaled as standard normal variables.10 These are:
Major river : This is a dummy that equals one if a river with a rank of at least 6
according to the North American Cartographic Information Society (NACIS) inter-
sects the ethnic group’s territory.
Dist. to coast : This is average distance from each point in the ethnic group’s territory
to the nearest point on the coast, in decimal degrees, calculated in ArcMap.
8See http://ecospriv4.epfl.ch/index.php?dir=pub/&file=pop_landuse_data.tar.gz
9Population density estimates for 1995 were obtained from the World Bank for country-level regions, and
populstat.info for sub-national regions.
10Raster data are taken from http://www.naturalearthdata.com/, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/
LUC/GAEZ/index.htm, and http://www.map.ox.ac.uk/data/.
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FIGURE 3. Land quality and historic population density
Land quality is on top, population density on bottom. Darker colors indicate higher values; the ranges of
both are given in Table 1.
Elevation: This is average elevation for the ethnic group. Raster data are provided
by the NACIS.
Pct. malarial: This is the fraction of the society’s territory in which malaria is en-
demic, according to the Malaria Atlas Project.
Precipitation: This is average annual precipitation (mm). Because some societies
are too small for a raster point to fall within their territory, I impute missing data
using the nearest raster point.
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Ruggedness: This is a measure of terrain ruggedness used by Nunn and Puga (2007).
This measures the elevation distance between a raster cell and its neighbors at a
fine level.
Temperature: This is the accumulated temperature on days with mean daily tem-
perature above 0◦C, computed using monthly data from 1961 to 2000 collected by
the Climate Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia. I treat 55537 is
as an error code and drop these points. I impute missing values using the nearest
raster point.
Date observed: This is the rough date at which the information on the society was
recorded, according to the Ethnographic Atlas. Where this is missing, I impute it
using the average value for other ethnic groups within the society’s ethnographic
region, of which there are 60 in the final sample.
Absolute latitude: This is the absolute value of the society’s latitude. This proxies for
unobservable characteristics that vary smoothly over space and may be correlated
with land quality or population density.
There are two additional controls added because of failings of the model – the share
of land devoted to desert (computed from the FAO-GAEZ data) and a dummy whether
the society obtains most of its income from fishing (computed from V 3 in the Ethno-
graphic Atlas). There are two major parts of the world where slavery is prevalent and
land quality is poor, contrary to the model’s predictions. The first is the Sahara, where,
despite low land quality, slaves could be used in transport and were easily captured from
neighboring societies by raiders on camel or horseback (Webb, 1995). The second is the
Pacific Northwest, in which groups such as the Haida used slaves in fishing and hunt-
ing, and were able to capture them using canoe raids (Donald, 1997). This region is
well known for having a relatively high surplus and developed material culture despite
the lack of importance of agriculture. These need not imply rejection of the model as
a whole. They are instead evidence that there are certain forms of slavery that cannot
be explained by a strictly agrarian interpretation of the model. Summary statistics for
these controls are given in Table 1.
4. RESULTS
4.1. In pictures. It is useful, first, to know whether the correlations predicted by the
model are apparent in the raw data. Because the dependent variables are binary, a
scatterplot will not represent the relationship clearly. Instead, I show the correlations
between land rights, slavery, land quality and population density by dividing the sam-
ple into deciles of land quality and historic population density. In Figure 4, I report the
fraction of societies in each decile that have land rights. In Figure 5, I do the same for
slavery. The raw correlations are as predicted. Land rights are strongly positively re-
lated to land quality and population density. Slavery is positively correlated with land
quality, though this is much weaker than the relationship for land rights. In the model,
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the existence of multiple steady states helps explain this. I do confirm below that the
correlation is statistically significant. Further, slavery is most prevalent in societies with
intermediate population densities.
FIGURE 4. Land rights by deciles of land quality and hist. pop. density
The y axis is the percentage of societies with land rights. The top picture divides this by deciles of land
quality, the bottom picture by deciles of population density.
4.2. Regressions. In Table 2, I report the results of estimating (5), (6) and (7). Specifi-
cally, I report the marginal effects for the land rights and population density variables.
For land quality, these can be interpreted as the effects of a one standard deviation im-
provement. When additional controls are added, the results suggest that a one standard
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FIGURE 5. Slavery by deciles of land quality and hist. pop. density
The y axis is the percentage of societies with slavery. The top picture divides this by deciles of land quality,
the bottom picture by deciles of population density.
deviation improvement in land quality raises the probability that land rights exist by
roughly 4.5%. Interpreting the coefficient on population density as an elasticity, a 1%
increase in population density is associated with a 0.118% increase in the chance that
land rights exist.11 A one standard deviation increase in land quality predicts a 4.7% in-
crease in the chance of slavery. While interpretations of the coefficients on the quadratic
11This is a reasonable approximation, though not strictly correct, because the normalization is log(1+pop.
den.), not log(pop. den.).
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TABLE 2. Main results
[Table 2 here]
TABLE 3. Alternative measures of the dependent variables
[Table 3 here]
of population density are less easy to interpret, the inverted-U probability profile visible
in Figure 5 is visible here.
5. ROBUSTNESS: WHAT THE MODEL CAN EXPLAIN
In this section, I show that the results in Section 4 are robust to several objections
that could be raised against them. I show that they can be replicated using alternative
measures of land rights and slavery, and that the measures used for the dependent vari-
ables are correlated with other measures of these in other samples not large enough to
be used for replicating the results. Second, I show that similar results can be obtained
using different estimates of both land rights and land quality, and that these alternative
measures are correlated with those used for the analysis. Third, I show that the results
generally survive additional robustness checks – for the importance of influential obser-
vations, for the possible endogeneity of land quality, and for alternative clustering of the
standard errors. Fourth, I argue that the results suggest that the model better explains
slavery then some notable competing theories.
5.1. Alternative measures of the dependent variables. Because land rights and slavery
are sharp indicators of the existence of these institutions, I use alternative measures of
each. Land rights in particular exist for some 74% of societies in the data, but do not
necessarily capture differences in how well defined these rights are. I begin by demon-
strating that my measure of land rights is positively correlated with v1726 in the SCCS, an
indicator for whether land is mostly private. The SCCS is a sub-sample of 186 societies
from the Ethnographic Atlas, to which researchers have been continually adding new
variables since its creation. These variables are not, however, regularly available for all
186 societies. Because v1726 is only available for 80 societies, I am not able to replicate
the econometric analysis with it. The results of regressing the existence of land rights
on v1726 are positive and significant, as reported in column (1) of Table 3.
Next, I use an indicator for whether the inheritance of land is patrilineal as an alter-
native measure of land rights.12 Following Goody (1969), this captures the degree to
which the control of real property is directed towards the nuclear family. Roughly, this
is one step along the transition from weakly defined to strongly defined rights in land.
Similarly, I use an indicator for whether land is inherited by sons.13 I show in columns
12Like the indicator for land rights, this is constructed using V74: Inheritance Rule for Real Property
(Land). This is equal to 1 if V74=4, V74=5, V74=6, or V74=7.
13This is equal to 1 if V74=7.
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TABLE 4. Alternative measures of land quality and population density
[Table 4 here]
(2) through (5) of Table 3 that both of these are positively related to land quality and
population density, conditional on the other controls.
For slavery, I can make similar tests. First, I show in column (6) of Table 3 that the
main measure of slavery is correlated with an indicator constructed from v919 of the
SCCS for the existence of large-scale slaveholding. In columns (7) through (10), I show
that the results can be mostly replicated by constructing alternative measures of slav-
ery from the Ethnographic Atlas. Slavery is recorded as either “absent” (1), “ incipient
or nonhereditary” (2) “reported but type not identified” (3), or “hereditary and socially
significant” (4). I create a “slavery above incipient” dummy for whether V 70 > 2, and a
“hereditary slavery” dummy for V 70 = 4. The positive conditional correlation between
land quality and non-incipient slavery is still apparent, as are the hump-shaped rela-
tionships with population density, though the link between land quality and hereditary
slavery is small and statistically insignificant.
5.2. Alternative measures of land quality and population density. I validate the use of
the land quality measure by showing that I am capable of replicating the results for land
rights using an alternative index of land quality created by Ramankutty et al. (2002), and
that I am able to correlate the principal measure with three alternative measures of land
quality contained in the SCCS – v921, v924 and v928. I show in column (1) of Table 4
that the land rights result survives the use of the Ramankutty et al. (2002) measure, and
in columns (3) through (5) I show the strong correlation between my principal measure
and the alternatives from the SCCS. Column (2), however, shows that the slavery result
cannot be replicated. Why? I show in Figure 6, in a manner similar to Figure 5, that the
raw data appear to reveal an inverse-U relationship between this measure and slavery.
Again, since at high population densities it becomes possible in the model to have a
steady state under free labor, this weakens the positive relationship of land quality and
slavery.
The use of population density in 1995 to weight ethnic groups within regions is ne-
cessitated by data availability. Further, the regional population density estimates are
themselves no more than educated guesses. My approach here is to replicate the results
with alternative proxies. In column (6) of Table 4, I show that the main measure of pop-
ulation density is correlated with an indicator of land shortage (v1720) from the SCCS.
In Columns (7) through (12), I show that the main results for land rights and slavery
can be replicated with two alternative measures of population density – density in 1995
and regional estimates from the ARVE data. Regional density from McEvedy et al. (1978)
gives an inverse-U but insignificant relationship with slavery. If the principal measure of
historical population density is replaced for Canada and the United States with the es-
timates reported in Ruff (2006), the results (not reported) are very similar to those given
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FIGURE 6. Slavery by deciles of Ramankutty et al. (2002) land quality
The y axis is the percentage of societies with slavery, divided by deciles of land quality.
in Table 2. Similarly, using the McEvedy et al. (1978) regional estimates as a base in (8)
(as opposed to the ARVE estimates) gives results gives results that are qualitatively the
same as in in Table 2, and just as statistically significant (not reported).
In addition, there are two variables in the SCCS (v64 and v1130) that create indepen-
dent estimates of the population densities of several societies in the data. These are not
continuous measures, but instead categorize the societies into bins. While there are not
enough observations and the data are too coarse to replicate the econometric analy-
sis, I show in Figures 7 and 8 that these alternative measures have similar relationships
with the institutions of interest as the main measure. Land rights are increasing in both
measures of population density, and slavery has a hump-shaped relationship with each.
How similar are these alternative measures of population density? In Table 5, I report
Spearman rank correlations and correlation coefficients between the various measures
used. For the African sub-sample, I add population density in 1960 as estimated by the
UNEP.14 While some of these measures are more strongly correlated than others, they
are all significant at the 1% level. What general lesson can be taken away from this? His-
torical population density estimates are untrustworthy. They are correlated with each
other, but at times they disagree even about the relative rankings of societies by popu-
lation density. Even still, they agree on two conclusions. Land rights have existed where
population was densest, and slavery was most likely at intermediate values of popula-
tion density, as in the model and consistent with the literature on African history.
14See http://na.unep.net/metadata/unep/GRID/AFPOP60.html.
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FIGURE 7. Land rights by bins of population density in the SCCS
The y axis is the percentage of societies with land rights. The top picture divides this by population density
bins according to v64, while the bottom picture does so following v1130.
TABLE 5. Correlations of population density measures
[Table 5 here]
5.3. Other robustness checks. In Table 6, I test whether the results are sensitive to the
inclusion of influential observations and sub-samples. I begin by re-estimating the re-
sults by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and computing both leverage and dfbeta statis-
tics for the variables of interest. In the slavery quadratic, this calculated for the linear
term. In columns (1) through (4) and (11) through (14), it is clear that the results do
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FIGURE 8. Slavery by bins of population density in the SCCS
The y axis is the percentage of societies with slavery. The top picture divides this by population density
bins according to v64, while the bottom picture does so following v1130.
not depend on including these observations. In columns (5), (6), (15), and (16), I repli-
cate the results excluding both North and South America. The results are unchanged
excepting that the relationship between slavery and land quality becomes small and
insignificant. This is surprising, as slavery was most prominent in areas of the Pacific
Northwest where agriculture was unimportant.
Dropping Europeans (columns 7-8 and 17-18) and their offshoots does not change the
results by much. Excluding non-agricultural societies (columns 9-10 and 19-20) com-
pletely eliminates the relationship between land quality and land rights, suggesting that
22 JAMES FENSKE
TABLE 6. Influential observations
[Table 6 here]
TABLE 7. Possible endogeneity of land quality
[Table 7 here]
TABLE 8. Alternative clusters (p. values)
[Table 8 here]
this is driven by better land quality permitting the existence of settled agriculture. This
highlights a mechanism by which societies move from SE to SS, rather than providing
evidence against the model.
I am not concerned here with possible reverse causation of population density. The
model expects that population growth will respond to institutions, and I am only test-
ing a correlation between two endogenous variables. Even if I were seeking a one-way
causal impact, it is unlikely that an instrumental variable exists that could alter popula-
tion levels on a macroeconomic scale without also affecting institutions.
I am, however, potentially concerned about the endogeneity of land quality. The FAO
measure is an index of several constraints, of which soil depth and soil fertility may be
potentially anthropogenic. In Table 7 I address this concern by controlling directly for
these components. If the entire relationship between the variables of interest and land
quality can be explained by correlation with these potentially endogenous components,
it is evidence that the causal inference may be spurious. The results show, however, that
the result survives separating land quality into its separate parts.
Finally, I have reported results with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. How
sensitive is the statistical inference to correlations in the errors within possible clusters?
I address this question in Table 8, clustering the standard errors by ethnographic region
(of which there are 60), by the principal country of the ethnic group, or by that country’s
global region classified by the UN.15 The “robust” errors are the baseline results. The
results are generally stable, though some choices of cluster push the results to p. values
of .12 or .14. The major exception is that slavery is not significantly related to land qual-
ity if the results are made robust to arbitrary correlation by country or by UN region.
This foreshadows the results of Section 6, suggesting that there are strong correlations
in institutions within broad regions.
5.4. Theories of slavery. In this section, I contrast the results outlined in Section 4 with
two other major theories of slavery and explain why the model outlined in Section 2
does a better job of explaining African slavery than either of these.
15Ethnic groups were classified according to the location of their centroid, and then obvious errors were
corrected manually. For example, the centroids for the Japanese and Annamese fall outside of Japan and
Vietnam, respectively.
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First, writers such as Inikori (1999) have suggested that African “slaves” held a position
closer to that of the European serf. In the model, slaves differ from free laborers in that
they are coerced workers whose price does not depend on the local supply of labor.
The severity of slavery is not important to this conceptual distinction. The dominant
theory of serfdom is that of North and Thomas (1971), who hold that serfs voluntarily
exchanged their labor for protection from lords. These payments were in inputs rather
than money because of the limited nature of output markets.
There are at least four reasons why this model cannot explain Africa. First, that model’s
applicability to any case has been called into question by Fenoaltea (1975), who demon-
strates that North and Thomas (1971) err in treating serfdom as voluntary, underes-
timate the transactions costs in labor contracts, misidentify the historical trends that
acted on the manorial system, and overemphasize the rigidity of “custom” in constrain-
ing institutional change. Second, both land quality and population density at low levels
have been shown in Section 4 to be positively associated with slavery. In the North and
Thomas (1971) model, these should promote the development of trade and markets,
lessening the need for contracts to be written in labor dues. This prediction is similar to
the argument of Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) that better outside options for coerced
workers may lower the amount of force used in equilibrium. Third, their model pre-
dicts that trade will discourage the use of serfs. This runs counter to the literature on
African history, which has shown that external trade in particular spurred greater use of
slaves in production (e.g. Lovejoy (2000) or Law (1995)). Finally, there is no evidence
that African slaves received payments that approximated their marginal products. In
many cases, slaveowners had to be compelled to receive manumission payments from
their slaves under colonial rule, suggesting that they were earning rents for which they
needed to be compensated. Austin (2009) provides several examples from nineteenth
century West Africa in which it was possible for the purchaser of a slave to recoup his
investment within six years.
The second theory of slavery I address is the collection of arguments that, in certain
contexts, slavery is more productive than free labor, which explains its use. For Fenoal-
tea (1984), this occurs where “pain incentives” are effective and detailed care by the
worker is unnecessary. Fogel and Engerman (1974) link the exceptional productivity of
slaves in the American south to economies of scale that could only be achieved through
gang labor, an activity so grueling that free men could not be induced to take part at any
price. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), similarly, argue that the cultivation of crops with
economies of scale is more conducive to slavery. Hanes (1996) explains the concentra-
tion of slaves in rural and domestic production by invoking the high turnover costs in
these industries.
These arguments again cannot alone explain slavery in Africa, even if they can ex-
plain it in other contexts. First, there is no evidence that slaves were used in produc-
tion in sectors systematically different than those dominated by free peasants. The fact
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TABLE 9. Results with region fixed effects
[Table 9 here]
that, over a few generations, slaves were often partly assimilated into their masters’ so-
cieties is evidence that they were not kept in economic isolation (Austin, 2009). Where
large slave communities or communities were present, (see e.g. Lovejoy (1978) for the
Sokoto Caliphate or Oroge (1971) for nineteenth century Yorubaland), these existed not
because slaves were used in economic tasks that free peasants were not, but because
they were acquired in large numbers by authorities and other elites. Studies of slav-
ery in individual African societies frequently make reference to slave labor and free la-
bor working in the same tasks. Austin (2005) notes gold and kola production in Asante
were both carried out by free people, pawns, corve´e labor, slaves, and descendants of
slaves. Uchendu (1979) shows for Igbo society that slaves first were used to fill subsis-
tence needs by farming and fishing, and only secondarily filled prestige functions. “In
domestic activities,” he argues, “no operation was strictly reserved for slaves.” Describ-
ing the Kerebe of Tanzania, Hartwig (1979) writes that masters often worked alongside
their slaves, who performed the same tasks as their owners and their owners’ wives.
Second, the literature on the “legitimate commerce” period suggests that slaves were
used in the activities where labor of all kinds was most productive; in the model this is
consistent with a rise in A¯, and does not require a different production function under
slavery. The nineteenth century export markets for oils, ivory, ostrich feathers and other
goods created higher returns to slave labor, and slavery within Africa intensified (Love-
joy, 2000).16 Third, African agriculture both past and present has been overwhelmingly
characterized by diminishing or constant returns to scale (Hopkins, 1973). Without ev-
idence of scale economies, an appeal to “pain incentives” is not necessary to explain
slavery over and above a comparison of the costs of slavery to those of free labor.17
6. HETEROGENEITY: WHAT THE MODEL CANNOT EXPLAIN
In Table 9, I show a simple method to do away with most of the results presented so
far: add fixed effects for the major ethnographic regions in the data. These are North
America, South America, Africa, the Circum-Mediterranean, the Insular Pacific, and
East Eurasia. There is still a relationship between population density and land rights,
and the marginal effect of land quality on slavery has not fallen by much, but the other
results have now disappeared completely. The model can predict differences across
broad regions, but not within them.
16Lynn (1997) also provides a survey of the period, while Law (1995) contains a number of case studies.
17Returning to the model, if slaves are worked harder than free laborers, their productivity may be en-
hanced by some factor η. This parameter will carry over into the definitions of Φ, Ψ, and Ω. However,
unless the shape of the production function itself changes, the qualitative shapes of the institutional re-
gions will not be different.
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TABLE 10. Galton’s problem
[Table 10 here]
Why? Anthropologists have a name for the fact that institutions diffuse across soci-
eties, making it impossible to have any truly independent ethnographic observations.
This is “Galton’s problem.” Economists would refer to it either as serial correlation, or
as spatial dependence. I propose that the lack of robustness of the main results stems
from spillovers across neighboring societies. If a nearby society has slavery, it is almost
impossible to avoid developing the institution or becoming slaves of your neighbor, re-
gardless of prevailing land quality and population density. The existence of rights over
land is an idea that can spread across societies, and can be used to defend claims against
a rival group.
In Table 10, I provide suggestive evidence that these neighbor effects exist by esti-
mating spatial lag and spatial error models. The spatial lag adds a term ρWy to the
estimating equation. W is an N × N spatial weight matrix, in which each entry Wij is
the inverse of the distance between observation i and observation j, normalized so that
its rows sum to 1 or 0. ρ captures whether the institutional outcome of one group will
affect its neighbor’s institutions. The reason this evidence is only suggestive is that ρ
is not separately identified from localized unobservables. This is estimated as a linear
probability model using maximum likelihood.18 The spatial error model is similar. Now,
the error term is given by u = λWu+ , so that a society’s random error may depend on
the error terms for societies that are close to it.
In Table 10 it is clear that there is very strong spatial correlation in land rights. The
Wald tests for ρ and λ are very large, even conditional on the observed controls. While
I do not report the estimates of ρ and λ, all values are positive. Once these controls are
added, none of the results concerning land quality survive. The results with population
density fare better, but for slavery these are only marginally significant in the spatial
lag model. While the model can explain differences across regions, it cannot explain
differences within them, and the strong spatial correlation in institutional outcomes
suggests this is due to neighbor effects.
I confirm the ability of the model to explain differences across regions in Figures 9
and 10. I show that the relationships between the averages of land quality and popula-
tion density within an ethnographic region are correlated with the fraction of societies
possessing land rights or slavery as the model predicts. These results will differ from the
plots in 4 and 5 because the number of observations differs by region. The positive rela-
tionships of land rights with both land quality and population density are still apparent,
and the inverse-U correlation between slavery and population density is still apparent.
Only the correlation between slavery and land quality cannot be seen across regions in
the data. Once again, the existence of multiple steady states can explain this.
18In particular, I use the spatreg command in Stata.
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FIGURE 9. Land rights, land quality and population density across regions
The y axis is the percentage of societies within a region with land rights. The x axis in the top picture is
average land quality for the region. In the bottom picture it is average log population density.
7. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
It appears then, that, the land abundance view performs reasonably well in predict-
ing broad differences in the prevalence of land rights and slavery between Africa and
the rest of the world, though not as well at predicting outcomes within regions. What of
other institutions discussed by historians of Africa? The relative lack of states central-
ization and high rates of polygyny have also been tied to sparse population. Rulers were
unable to tie subjects to the land and tax them, sought subjects and cattle, rather than
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FIGURE 10. Slavery, land quality and population density across regions
The y axis is the percentage of societies within a region with slavery. The x axis in the top picture is average
land quality for the region. In the bottom picture it is average log population density.
territory, and had to contend with the ability of subjects to exit easily (Austin, 2004a,b).
Goody (1976) argues that polygyny exists where allocating land to additional wives is
less costly but their labor is valuable.
In figures 11 and 12, I show that the prevalence of states in the global sample mim-
ics that of rights over land, rising monotonically with land quality and population den-
sity.19 Polygyny, by contrast, mimics the pattern seen for slavery – its presence increases
19I measure state centralization as a dummy variable, equal to one if variable 33 in the Ethnographic Atlas,
the levels of jurisdiction above the local, is greater than one.
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FIGURE 11. State centralization by deciles of land quality and hist. pop.
density
The y axis is the percentage of societies with state centralization. The top picture divides this by deciles
of land quality, the bottom picture by deciles of population density.
weakly with land quality, but is strongest at intermediate levels of population.20 In Table
11, I replicate (5), (6) and (7) with these variables as outcomes. The correlations between
state centralization, land quality and population density remain apparent. The relation-
ships between polygyny and these variables are not robust to the inclusion of additional
controls – malaria ecology is sufficient to make either one insignificant. Generally, then,
20I measure polygyny as a dummy variable, equal to one if variable 9 in the Ethnographic Atlas, marial
composition, is 3, 4, 5, or 6. This codes outcome 2, “Independent nuclear, occasional polygyny”, as zero.
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FIGURE 12. Polygyny by deciles of land quality and hist. pop. density
The y axis is the percentage of societies for which polygyny is the norm. The top picture divides this by
deciles of land quality, the bottom picture by deciles of population density.
TABLE 11. Other outcomes
[Table 11 here]
this suggests that the land abundance view may have power to explain institutions in
addition to land rights and slavery.
Bad institutions are one of the fundamental causes of African poverty, and the institu-
tions that exist on the continent currently have been shaped by those that existed prior
to colonial rule. I have addressed a theme in the economics literature – how geography
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affects institutions – by looking in depth at one hypothesis from the literature on African
history. I find that African land tenure and slavery have been decisively shaped by the
continent’s abundance of land and scarcity of labor. I find that this perspective explains
much about institutions across a global cross-section of societies, but that neighbor ef-
fects weaken its ability to predict differences within them.
These tests have made several points that must be taken into account in understand-
ing the impacts of under-population on African institutions. First, when both produc-
tivity and population are low, the opportunity cost of coercion is high, and the benefit
to creating estates is low. This explains why slavery is less common among the most
sparsely populated societies. Africa appears not as the least populous region in the sam-
ple, but as one that of medium density. While it is comparatively more prone to slavery
than Europe or South Asia, there the is more slavery on the continent than in many parts
of the Americas. Second, greater land quality (as well as access to trade), will encour-
age increased reliance on slavery conditional on population. This explains why some of
the most agriculturally prosperous though densely populated regions in Africa, such as
Sokoto, also used slaves most intensively (cf. Hill (1985)). Finally, there are substantial
institutional spatial correlations across African societies relating to land rights and slav-
ery. These revisions to the current thinking allow the “land abundance” perspective to
better explain institutions and are borne out in comparative data.
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APPENDIX A. APPLICATION OF THE “LAND ABUNDANCE” VIEW TO THE EGBA
In order to supplement the econometric tests, I have also collected information on
the Egba of southwestern Nigeria from their arrival at the town of Abeokuta in 1830 to
their loss of formal independence in 1914. While the Egba fit many standard predictions
for a land-abundant society, there are two key exceptions. First, they sold land amongst
themselves as early as 1870. Second, land disputes existed. These are explained by ini-
tially high population densities created by their settlement as refugees at Abeokuta, and
by the specific features of certain parcels of land that gave them uncommon value.
During the nineteenth century, the Egba mostly cultivated maize, cotton, yams, cas-
sava and beans, and exported oil and kernels gathered from wild palm trees to European
markets. Late in the century, cocoa and kola were introduced. I take data from sec-
ondary sources, oral histories, missionary records, travelers’ descriptions, official corre-
spondence and private letters. My principal sources are a collection of 541 Native Court
cases involving farmland that took place between 1902 and 1919; these are housed in
the National Archives, Abeokuta, and in the Hezekiah Oluwasanmi Library at Obafemi
Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.
The “land abundance” narrative has significant power to explain Egba land tenure.
In 1877, an Anglican missionary reported that cultivators could acquire land they de-
veloped from forest, either for free or in return for token payments (Agiri, 1974, p. 467).
This could be true even when land was acquired for planting cocoa or kola. Because
land was so cheaply available, the market for land was thin. European visitors did not
believe that the Egba sold land during the nineteenth century, and even after sales had
come into existence many disputants in the court records stated that they did not be-
lieve these to be legitimate. The use of long fallows – sometimes up to twenty years –
economized on labor. Rights over land were often held only so long as the land was un-
der cultivation, and the “caretakers” left behind to keep track of a fallow plot could, over
time, acquire de facto ownership.
How, then, do we explain land sales and land disputes among the Egba? First, land
was not abundant at all times in Egba society. Mabogunje (1961) notes that during the
initial scramble for land at Abeokuta, township chiefs were required to give up their
rights to land so that newcomers could settle, so that the town would grow larger and
more secure from attack. This devolved control of land to families. Mabogunje (1961)
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believes that this set the stage for later land sales. A Boserupian interpretation of his
argument would, within the model, represent this as a shift from SE to SS. Using leg-
endary accounts of the Egba homeland and travelers’ estimates of Abeokuta’s popula-
tion during the 1850s and 1860s, it is clear that the Egba lost over 80% of their territory,
and were at least twice as densely settled in 1830 as they were in 1914. In the area imme-
diately around Abeokuta, fallows were shorter, intercropping more intense, and forest
less present as late as 1902.
Second, Austin (2008a) has noted that, even while land is abundant, “good” land is
always scarce. For the Egba, lands closer to their settlements and under the protection
of powerful chiefs were more valuable and often the subject of dispute. Within the sam-
ple of court records, land that was more valuable due to cocoa or palm trees was more
vigilantly defended and more likely to be involved in a commercial transaction. Plots
endowed with palm trees were pawned more often, and more frequently defended with
the placement of a caretaker. Greater damages were claimed in cases involving cocoa.
For the Egba, the abundance of land prevented the emergence of wage labor. Even
during the slack season, individuals could gather forest products for themselves. Exam-
ples of paid work in the nineteenth century almost always involve missionaries hiring
(or struggling to hire) laborers. Slavery was, as Oroge (1971) has described, an impor-
tant means used by the war chiefs and major traders to secure access to labor where
wage work was absent. Various estimates suggest that slaves were anywhere from one
fifth to a “very considerable” proportion of the population.21 The war chiefs, who in the
model had the smallest γ, were the biggest holders of slaves. They were owed captives
taken by their soldiers in raids, and could use their slaves in a variety of other tasks.
Most slaves were used where the model would predict – where A¯ was highest. Male and
female slaves were used as porters and canoe pullers, and female slaves were used in
palm oil production. Burton (1863, p. 301) believed that commerce raised the demand
for slaves. British officials and traders, believing that slavery was indispensable, were
afraid to upset the institution. Instead, they moved to abolish slave dealing (as opposed
to slave holding), and worked only to check the worst abuses by slave owners.
For the Egba, institutional spillovers in land tenure resemble those suggested by the
econometric results. This was because the Egba had Lagos as a southern neighbor. Af-
ter 1861, this was a British colony. It was through Lagos that missionaries and mission-
educated repatriated slaves came to Lagos, introducing ideas of individual ownership,
and asking to purchase land in freehold as they had in Sierra Leone (Mabogunje, 1961).
The Egba also influenced land tenure in Lagos. After an anti-Christian uprising in 1867,
many Egba converts fled to Lagos, and were allotted parcels by the Governor on land
given to him by a Lagos chief. Over time, these came to be viewed largely as freehold
grants and were one of the spearheads for alienability of land in Lagos (Mann, 2007). In
21See, for example, Oroge (1971, p. 166), Bowen (1857, p. 320), Burton (1863, p. 299) or NAUK, CO 147/133,
enc in 4 June, 1898: Denton to Chamberlain, Evidence for 18th day.
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the case of slavery, the Egba also gained from their neighbors’ practices; by mid-century,
slaves were increasingly purchased in markets to the North, in Rabba and Ilorin. By
1870, “Hausa” slaves were the majority in Abeokuta (Agiri, 1981, p. 137). These north-
erners were far from home and less likely to flee. Anti-slavery policies in Lagos gave
Egba slaves a means of escape, and led to political crises between the two states (Oroge,
1975).
That the Egba can be so easily understood in terms of the “land abundance” view
gives this narrative further support.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean s.d. Min Max N
Any slavery 0.54 0.50 0 1 1,041
Any land rights 0.74 0.44 0 1 801
Land quality 1.33 0.90 0.00 3.98 1,206
Date observed 1905 53.0 1500 1965 1,206
Historic pop density 54.5 111 0.00 1,074 1,206
Precipitation 1,263 858 12.6 6,164 1,206
Temperature 7,203 2,774 35.5 10,830 1,206
Absolute latitude 20.7 17.0 0.017 78.1 1,206
Pct. malarial 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.69 1,206
Dist. to coast 4.26 3.87 0.00 16.5 1,206
Elevation 167 9.61 141 230 1,206
Major river 0.28 0.45 0 1 1,206
Ruggedness 121,122 132,811 137 977,941 1,206
Share desert 0.11 0.26 0 1 1,206
Mostly fishing 0.069 0.25 0 1 1,206
Notes: Variable definitions in text.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Land quality 0.091*** (0.017) 0.046*** (0.018)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.147*** (0.009) 0.118*** (0.011)
Precipitation -0.047** (0.021) -0.026 (0.022)
Temperature -0.028 (0.030) -0.056* (0.033)
Date observed 0.050*** (0.019) -0.004 (0.017)
Share desert 0.010 (0.018) 0.035** (0.016)
Dist. to coast -0.023 (0.018) 0.020 (0.018)
Elevation -0.007 (0.019) -0.006 (0.018)
Pct. malarial 0.174*** (0.026) 0.125*** (0.025)
Ruggedness 0.064*** (0.017) 0.025 (0.017)
Absolute latitude -0.107*** (0.033) -0.076* (0.039)
Major river -0.031 (0.034) -0.063* (0.034)
Mostly fishing -0.125* (0.074) 0.025 (0.069)
Observations 801 801 801 801
Land quality 0.040*** (0.015) 0.047** (0.021)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.269*** (0.029) 0.103*** (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.039*** (0.005) -0.013** (0.006)
Precipitation -0.063** (0.025) -0.051** (0.026)
Temperature 0.218*** (0.038) 0.222*** (0.038)
Date observed -0.049*** (0.019) -0.065*** (0.021)
Share desert 0.033 (0.022) 0.025 (0.020)
Dist. to coast 0.048** (0.023) 0.053** (0.024)
Elevation 0.013 (0.022) 0.010 (0.023)
Pct. malarial 0.386*** (0.030) 0.360*** (0.030)
Ruggedness 0.135*** (0.021) 0.127*** (0.022)
Absolute latitude 0.111*** (0.042) 0.138*** (0.042)
Major river 0.089** (0.042) 0.088** (0.042)
Mostly fishing 0.388*** (0.078) 0.402*** (0.081)
Observations 1041 1041 1041 1041
Table 2. Main results
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions are probit, with marginal effects reported.
Any land rights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any slavery
(5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any land rights
Land mostly private (v1726 in SCCS) 0.301**
(0.144)
Land quality 0.050** 0.051**
(0.023) (0.022)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.126*** 0.175***
(0.014) (0.015)
Observations 80 801 801 801 801
Other cont. N Y Y Y Y
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Any slavery
Large scale slaveholding (v919 in SCCS) 0.538***
(0.166)
Land quality 0.037* 0.014
(0.021) (0.015)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.215*** 0.116***
(0.040) (0.029)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.027*** -0.014***
(0.006) (0.005)
Observations 166 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N Y Y Y Y
Table 3: Alternative measures of the dependent variables
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are
probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Land is patrilineal Land inherited by sons
Slavery above incipient Hereditary slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any L.R. Any Sl. v921 v924 v928 v1720
L.Q. (Ramankutty et al.) 0.066*** -0.007
(0.018) (0.021)
Land quality 1.677*** 0.703*** 0.871***
(0.254) (0.112) (0.107)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.062**
(0.027)
Observations 801 1,041 172 172 172 79
R-squared 0.223 0.196 0.274
Other cont. Y Y N N N N
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln pop density 1995 0.098*** 0.123***
(0.010) (0.046)
ln pop. den. 95 sqrd. -0.013**
(0.006)
ln(MJ pop. den.) 0.077*** 0.033
(0.012) (0.029)
ln(MJ pop. den.) sqrd. -0.006
(0.005)
ln(1+ ARVE pop. den.) 0.090*** 0.186***
(0.014) (0.048)
ln(1+ARVE pop. den.) sqrd. -0.027***
(0.008)
Observations 801 801 801 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions are probit, excepting columns 3, 4 and 5, with marginal effects reported. Columns 3, 4, and 5 are
OLS. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Table 4: Alternative measures of land quality and population density
Spearman correlations
Historic 
pop 
density
Pop. den. 
1995
MJ pop. 
den.
ARVE 
pop. den.
v64 v1130
Hist pop. 
den. 
(bins)
Af. pop. 
den. 
1960
Historic pop density 1.00
Pop. den. 1995 0.94 1.00
MJ pop. den. 0.72 0.70 1.00
ARVE pop. den. 0.82 0.78 0.92 1.00
v64 0.69 0.67 0.38 0.48 1.00
v1130 0.66 0.65 0.35 0.44 0.88 1.00
Hist pop. den. (bins) 0.95 0.91 0.70 0.78 0.65 0.62 1.00
Af. pop. den. 1960 0.66 0.68 0.29 0.38 0.71 0.72 0.58 1.00
Correlation coefficients
Historic pop density 1.00
Pop. den. 1995 0.86 1.00
MJ pop. den. 0.64 0.56 1.00
ARVE pop. den. 0.72 0.58 0.84 1.00
v64 0.53 0.58 0.39 0.42 1.00
v1130 0.58 0.62 0.37 0.42 0.90 1.00
Hist pop. den. (bins) 0.64 0.64 0.48 0.56 0.70 0.73 1.00
Af. pop. den. 1960 0.83 0.89 0.23 0.26 0.58 0.58 0.63 1.00
Table 5: Correlations of population density measures
Notes: All values significant at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Land quality 0.059*** 0.086*** 0.032*** 0.036* 0.004
(0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.111*** 0.124*** 0.044*** 0.115*** 0.029***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006)
Dropped Lev LQ DfB LQ Lev PD DfB PD Americas Americas Euro. Euro. NonAg NonAg
Observations 744 744 749 754 597 597 781 781 610 610
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Land quality 0.039* 0.046** 0.010 0.055*** 0.044*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.124*** 0.162*** 0.122** 0.118*** 0.112**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.049) (0.039) (0.046)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.015** -0.017** -0.017** -0.014** -0.012*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Dropped Lev LQ DfB LQ Lev PD DfB PD Americas Americas Euro. Euro. NonAg NonAg
Observations 983 973 984 966 687 687 1,016 1,016 759 759
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 6: Influential observations
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with
marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Any land rights
Any slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land quality 0.069*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.084***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027)
Soil depth constraints 0.095*** 0.053**
(0.019) (0.021)
Soil fertility constraints 0.020 0.074***
(0.018) (0.026)
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y
Table 7: Possible endogeneity of land quality
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with marginal effects
reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clustering
Land quality Robust 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
Ethno. region 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02
Country 0.00 0.03 0.37 0.08
UN region 0.00 0.08 0.34 0.10
ln(1+pop. den.) Robust 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Ethno. region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Country 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
UN region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. Robust 0.00 0.03
Ethno. region 0.00 0.04
Country 0.00 0.14
UN region 0.00 0.09
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N Y N Y
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: All regressions are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in
the table of main results.
Table 8: Alternative clusters (p. values)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land quality 0.014 0.037
(0.018) (0.023)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.102*** -0.004
(0.012) (0.043)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.004
(0.007)
Observations 801 801 1,041 1,041
Other cont. Y Y Y Y
Table 9: Results with region fixed effects
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with marginal effects
reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spatial error model
Land quality 0.031** 0.017 0.006 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.079** 0.040
(0.010) (0.011) (0.031) (0.031)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.017*** -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)
Wald test (λ=0) 660.8 299.8 527.7 191.3 1481 1543 638.2 676.8
Observations 801 801 801 801 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Spatial lag model
Land quality 0.029** 0.017 0.011 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.061*** 0.031
(0.009) (0.010) (0.023) (0.027)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.013*** -0.007
(0.004) (0.004)
Wald test (ρ=0) 555.8 127.0 191.8 56.63 1435 1071 217.0 225.4
Observations 801 801 801 801 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
Table 10: Galton's problem
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions
are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are as in the table of main results.
Any land rights Any slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land quality 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.013
(0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.134*** 0.166*** 0.253*** -0.052
(0.009) (0.013) (0.027) (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.042*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.006)
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
Table 11: Other outcomes
Any state centralization Polygyny is usual
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are: Absolute latitude, major river, mostly
fishing, precipitation, temperature, date observed, dist. to coast, pct. malarial, elevation, ruggedness, share desert,
elevation.
